1) The Buddha taught that this whole set of virtues [, charity, morality, patience, strength, recollection], has knowledge as its aim: he who desires deliverance from pain must therefore produce knowledge within himself.
2) Two truths are distinguished, and two orders of true things that correspond to them: erroneous truth, or the truth of the world, to which corresponds what those in error see as true; true truth, to which reality corresponds: reality lies beyond the domain of the intellect; the intellect moves in the order of error.
3) Two kinds of men belonging to the world, that is to say moving in the sphere of erroneous truth, are distinguished: the meditative and ordinary men: the view the former have of things contradicts and invalidates that of the latter.
4) And the meditative, in their turn, contradict one another by reason of the ever greater perfection of their knowledge: the wisest see better than the less advanced. Although they do not interpret this comparison of Scripture in the same way, they all recognize that things are like a mirage, a dream, a magical creation; they agree in invalidating the opinion of ordinary men — In view of the goal to be reached, namely Buddhahood, there is no need to examine the metaphysical value of the means: the meditative know that they are illusions, but apply themselves to them nonetheless.
5) Ordinary men see and conceive things as real, whereas the meditative conceive them as illusory: such is the conflict between the meditative and ordinary men.
6) The existence of colour, sound, etc., which are immediately perceived, is not established by legitimate means of knowledge but by the assent of the world; this assent is erroneous, like the assent that recognizes as pure, permanent, pleasant, etc., what is in reality impure and impermanent.
7) If the Buddha taught the existence of the skandhas, the constituent elements of so-called individuals, it was to lead ignorant and prejudiced creatures into the knowledge of “emptiness”, and not by taking the standpoint of true truth. — “How so?” it will be said; “was it not from the standpoint of true truth that the Buddha taught the momentary character of the skandhas!” — Error: the skandhas, etc., are not momentary from the standpoint of true truth, for in reality there are no skandhas — “It will follow, then,” comes the reply, “that the skandhas are momentary from the standpoint of apparent truth, and this assertion is contradicted by appearance, by experience.”
Error! For the meditative, who know the non-existence of individuals, experience includes the momentariness of the dharmas; and, compared with ordinary men, the meditative see the truth! — Come round to our view, or else we shall answer ad hominem: you maintain that the skandhas really exist and are momentary; for our part, appealing to the experience of ordinary men, we shall say that the world holds woman to be “pure”, and contradicts you when you declare her “impure”.
“But,” it will be said, “what merit can flow from the worship of an illusory Buddha?” — The same question, we reply, arises in the same terms if the Buddha is something real.
“So be it; but if what is called a “creature” is an illusory thing, how is it that this creature, once dead, is reborn?” — Because the illusion that constitutes this creature lasts as long as the complex of causes that produces it. Some illusions, such as a magical creation for example, last a short time; the creature, illusory too, extends in a long series: that is the only difference, and it does not make the creature really exist.
“But,” you will say, “there is no sin in killing or robbing a phantom created by a magician: consequently, if creatures are illusory, does not all morality collapse?” — There is no thought in a magical creation, whereas creatures are clothed in that magic which is thought: hence sin and merit, according as one treats creatures ill or well.
“But thought is not a magic! We observe, indeed, that magical formulas do not create thought.” — Magics are diverse in nature and produced by diverse causes: one does not see a single and same cause produce every effect.
“But if the creature is only a magical illusion; if the creature, in fact and in reality in the state of nirvana, finds itself in the state of transmigration only from the standpoint of appearance, only through the effect of an illusion, it follows that the Buddha himself will go on transmigrating: and in that case, what is the use of the practice of the future Buddhas, what is the use of Buddhism's doctrine of salvation?”
As long as its causes are not interrupted, so long does this illusion that is thought endure: and that is why creatures, in fact non-existent, go on transmigrating. But when the causes are destroyed, there is no longer any production of this magic of thought, there is no longer any existence of the creature, even from the standpoint of experiential truth.
“If there does not really exist a deluded principle, namely thought, who then perceives the illusion?”
If, as our opponent maintains, the illusion does not exist as an object, the deluded thought alone exists: what is perceived?
“What is perceived is a form of thought, thought taking on this or that aspect.” — But then this aspect of thought, posited as object, is in reality other than thought, the subject of knowledge.
Now you deny that the object of knowledge is different from the subject of knowledge: therefore the illusion, the illusory object, is nothing other than thought, the subject of knowledge. But, on this hypothesis, what is perceived? what perceives? The Buddha, indeed, declared that thought does not see thought: just as the edge of the sword does not cut itself, so the mind does not reach itself.
“But we maintain, on the contrary, that thought, being luminous, illuminates itself as a lamp does.” — The comparison is worthless, for the lamp,
19 b-20 a “We do not claim that the lamp illuminates itself as it illuminates a jar, but rather that, to be what it is, that is to say luminous, it has no need of any outside intervention. We observe, indeed, that some things have no need of the help of another and that others do need it: for example, to possess the quality of blue, blue does without another blue, but crystal does not.”
20 b. This second example is worthless: if blue were not constituted as blue by its causes, it would not make itself blue by its own power.
22) [But let us grant that the lamp is, by its nature and of itself, luminous: that does not prove that the mind knows itself. Indeed, the mind observes and affirms that the lamp is luminous; but that the mind is luminous, by what knowledge is it known? what knowledge affirms it? Clearly out of the question are the thoughts or cognitions prior to, subsequent to or simultaneous with the cognition that would be perceived.]
23) Whether the mind is luminous by nature, like a lamp, or not luminous, like a jar, no one sees the mind: it is like the coquetry of the daughter of a barren woman; it is an idle game to speak of it.
24) “But,” it will be said, “if there is no self-awareness, how is it that one remembers one's thought?” — When an object external to thought has been perceived, it happens that the memory of it arises; and, by association, one remembers [the perception of which it was the object — without any need for a seed deposited in thought by self-awareness]. Just as rat poison, introduced into the body at a certain moment, manifests itself later, at the sound of thunder.
25 a) “But you admit that another's thought appears to us when it is brought into relation with certain factors, magical powers, etc.: so thought is not always withdrawn from perception, and we maintain that it can know itself, by reason of certain other factors.”
25 b) Bad reasoning: there are magical ointments whose application allows one to see a hidden jar or treasure; but the jar is not the same thing as the ointments. Another's thought can be known, just as the jar can; but that does not prove that thought can know itself.
26) [“But if thought does not know itself, the object is not known either, and all experience must be denied.”] — In our system, sense knowledge, knowledge by testimony and knowledge produced by reasoning are admitted; all this is admitted as experientially true [and without examining it from the critical standpoint]. But, from the critical standpoint, the supposition that experience is real is condemned: this supposition is the cause of pain.
If the opponent's text conforms to his fundamental thesis, the object he declares illusory is not other than thought; it is not identical with thought, according to what we said above; it is not at once other than thought and identical with thought, for there is contradiction; will it be said that it is neither other nor identical? There is contradiction. And besides, if the object really exists, it must indeed be other; if it is other, it does not really exist.
In our view, just as the illusory object, although non-existent, is visible, so the mind, although non-existent, sees.
“Surely,” it will be said, “samsara, the process of transmigration, of defilement and purification, must have a real thing as its support, namely thought.” — If samsara has a real thing as its support, it is different from this real thing and consequently unreal, like space: for in your system thought alone is real.
“So be it, samsara is unreal, but, taking its support on thought, which is real, it is endowed with activity.” — Let us grant that a real thing can serve as support for an unreal thing, which is false: it remains to be known how an unreal thing can be endowed with activity by the fact that it rests on a real thing?
It follows that, for our opponents, and whatever they may say, thought can only be perfectly isolated, with nothing to accompany or defile it: if thought has no object, all creatures are Buddhas.
Now they maintain that there is in creatures adherence to the existence of subject and object. What, then, does their supposition that thought alone exists mean, and what purpose does it serve?
“But,” comes the reply, “you are not sheltered from the same criticism: if one recognizes the illusory character of thought, etc., how can this knowledge destroy passion? We see the magician fall in love with the magical woman he himself created.”
This objection does not hold: the magician in question has not cast off the tendency to attribute reality to sense representations; at the sight of this woman, the idea he has of her nothingness remains powerless to prevent the birth of passion.
But when one takes up the idea of the void, when one is imbued with it, the idea of existence disappears; and later, through the habit of this thought that “nothing exists”, the idea of the void itself is eliminated.
Indeed, when, as a result of the elimination of the idea of existence, one no longer perceives an existence that could be denied, how then would non-existence, henceforth deprived of support, present itself before the mind?
And when neither existence nor non-existence any longer presents itself before the mind, then, having no more matter to affirm or to deny, which are these two modes of action, the mind is stilled.
“But,” it will be said, “if the Buddha is in this way definitively stilled, how can he accomplish the salvation of creatures?” — Just as the miraculous stone or the wishing tree fulfils the desires of creatures, so the miraculous body of the Buddha appears as a source of bliss, and this through the efficacy of the resolutions the Buddha made when he was a Bodhisattva and through that of the pious acts of the faithful themselves.
Likewise, a snake charmer may die once he has consecrated a “healing post”: after his death, this post long continues to heal snake bites.
Likewise there has been consecrated by the Bodhisattva this “post of the Victorious One”, which is the practice of the future Buddhas: although the Bodhisattva is extinguished, this post does all that must be done.
“But,” it will be said, “how can worship rendered to a being devoid of thought be efficacious?” — For no Buddhist is there any reason to distinguish the worship of the living Buddha from the worship of the extinguished Buddha: they are, according to Scripture, equally fruitful. Whether the fruit is real or only apparent, opinions differ. Consequently, the worship of an illusory Buddha is fruitful; were it otherwise, how would the worship of a real Buddha be so? Since this Buddha, in any case, is extinguished.
“The sight of the Noble Truths produces deliverance: what is the good of the sight of emptiness?” — Because, according to Scripture, one obtains Bodhi, one even obtains deliverance, only by this path of the sight of emptiness.
“[But this Scripture you quote is the Great Vehicle:] now I do not admit the authenticity of the Great Vehicle.” — And for what reason do you admit the authenticity of your Scriptures? — “Because there are two of us who admit it.” — But, for you yourself, the authenticity of your Scriptures was not established before you had admitted it.
The reasons you have for venerating your Scriptures command the same respect for the Great Vehicle, [for it presents the same internal marks of authenticity].
“[But non-Buddhists recognize the authenticity of our Scriptures, and do not recognize the authenticity of yours!]” — If we must rely on the opinion of unbelievers, it follows that the Veda is true, as well as all the Brahmanical theories.
“But,” you will say, “the followers of the Great Vehicle are not in agreement among themselves?” — [If this argument holds], you have only to abandon your own Scriptures: for you, [followers of the Lesser Vehicle,] are in contradiction with the unbelievers and in contradiction among yourselves.
The religion of the Buddha has as its root the state of the religious, [that is to say the destruction of the passions]. And the state of the religious — as also nirvana [which is its fruit] — is impossible as long as thought rests upon an object. [Therefore the sight of emptiness is indispensable.]
If the destruction of the passions, [insofar as it is produced by the sight of the truths], suffices to produce deliverance, it follows that deliverance will immediately follow [the sight of the truths and] the corresponding destruction of the passions: now this is not the case, for it is known from Scripture that the [saints of the Lesser Vehicle, who possess the sight of the truths], are capable of actions [good or bad, of actions] that are, however, not passional.
“But,” you will say, “they are free from thirst or covetousness, the cause [of rebirth].” — [Not so, for they
95) “But atoms have no parts: from which it follows that they come into contact without penetrating one another.” — Precisely, an atom cannot penetrate another atom; the atom presents no void, it offers neither hollow nor projection. [Do you say that there is no penetration between atoms, but only concurrence: this explanation remains insufficient: for the atom, having no parts, can come into contact only in its totality]. Therefore there is no concurrence if there is no mixing, and there is no mixing if there is no penetration.
96) It is impossible for a thing devoid of parts to be united with another: wherever conjunction is observed, it is a matter of divisible things.
97 a) As for visual knowledge, etc., [which, to produce sensation, would have to come into contact with the sense organ and with the external object], it is immaterial: how could it be capable of conjunction?
97 b) As for masses, [material objects formed of atoms], they do not really exist, [being only a heap of parts]: this has been demonstrated above.
98 a) Therefore what is called “contact” does not exist; therefore sensation is impossible.
98 b-99) Why then these efforts [to obtain pleasure or to avoid suffering]? Who could [enjoy pleasure or] suffer from suffering? And you, Covetousness, do you not see that there is neither sensation nor being who feels? What then have you to do here?
100) No doubt one sees, one touches, one knows: but the thought that is the agent of these operations is like a magic, like a vision in a dream, [for it is produced by causes]. On the other hand, what one knows, touches or sees is born with the knowing, the touch or the sight, being contained in that same complex which produces thought. — Consequently sensation does not exist.
101) [“We admit that “what is seen”, being produced at the same time as the sight, is not seen: but from “what is seen” there arises afterwards a cognition that takes on the form of the “object” and perceives it.”] — Prior or subsequent, the [cognition] may be what is called “memory”, but not what is called “sensation”: sensation does not know itself, nor is it perceived by another [simultaneous] cognition.
102) There exists no subject of sensation, [thought or any other principle]; therefore sensation does not really exist. This whole [process and] complex [mental and physical] is devoid of “self”; there is no individual and substantial being bound by sensation.
103) Knowledge or mind is found neither in the sense organs, nor in the objects, nor between the two, nor inside the body, nor in the limbs of the body. Its existence is observed nowhere else.
104) That which exists neither in the body nor outside the body, neither in a state of mixture nor in a state of isolation, does not exist: therefore creatures, by their own nature, are in a state of absolute nirvana.
105-106 a) If the [visual, etc.] knowledge is prior to its object, on what does it take its support in order to be born? On what does it take its support if it is simultaneous with it or subsequent to it?
106 b) The same considerations establish that nothing, in reality, can be produced [: the effect can be neither prior to, nor simultaneous with, nor subsequent to the cause].
107) “But if appearances are unreal, it is false that there are two truths [and the whole edifice of the spiritual life, built on apparent truth, collapses]; or else [you will say that reality, empty in itself, taken as object by the intellect, which is illusion, takes on the aspect called “apparent”: it will follow that], the illusion “appearance” being created by another illusion, “intellect”, the creature cannot attain nirvana.”
108) [We exist through the illusion we have of existing, but] the delivered being does not exist through an illusion that is his own: the fact that he is the object of another being's illusory thought does not make him exist even from the standpoint of appearances. — What is determined by causes exists apparently; what is not produced by causes does not exist with apparent existence.
109) [“But if, in reality, nothing is produced, if knowledge and its object are without true existence, what must one think both of the critical examination you are pursuing here and of yourself?”] — The mind that supposes and the thing supposed exist by reason of each other. All critical examination, whatever it may be, rests on these two data as they are admitted in the world [, and not on true truth].
110) “[But, you will say, this critical examination, belonging to the domain of illusory truth, must be criticized in its turn] and if one criticizes the criticism, one will never be able to stop, for the new criticism will also have to be criticized.”
111) [You are mistaken:] when one has examined from the critical standpoint what must be criticized [that is to say the commonly accepted notions of knowledge, etc.], there is no longer any support for examination [, for the notions are dissolved.] Examination, from then on, no longer arises [, nor any mental operation], and that is nirvāṇa.
112-113) As for him who admits the true existence of critical examination and of the thing examined, his position is disastrous, for either he recognizes the existence of the object by reason of knowledge, and then how is the existence of knowledge established? or else knowledge is established by reason of the object, and then how is the existence of the object established? or else the existence of the object is established by knowledge and conversely: in that case, neither the one nor the other is established [, for there is a vicious circle].
114) [Let us give an example:] if there is no “father” when there is no “son”, how will the son be able to be born? Now there is no father in the absence of a son. Consequently, neither the one nor the other exists.
115) “[But we do not say that knowledge and the object produce each other!] Just as, we say, the shoot is born of the seed and the seed is revealed, manifested by the shoot, so it is possible to conclude to the existence of the object by reason of the knowledge that is produced by this object.”
116) From a shoot one concludes to the existence of a seed: but this conclusion is drawn not by the shoot but by a [third] principle, namely knowledge [furnished with all the necessary information: the existence of shoots, of seeds, the relation of effect to cause between the shoot and the seed]; but how is the existence of the knowledge from which one could conclude to that of the object known, [in the absence of self-awareness, shown to be inadmissible]?
117) The world, by reason of direct perception [and of reasoning], recognizes the existence of causes of manifold nature: the variety of the various parts of the lotus proceeds from the variety of the cause.
118) And what is the origin of the variety of the cause? The variety of the prior cause, [and so on to infinity, without this regressus being vicious, since samsāra, or the evolution of the universe, has had no origin]. — And by what efficacy does the cause give birth to this or that effect? By the efficacy of the prior cause.
119) “God is the cause of the world.” — What do you mean by God? The elements? Then it is not worth the trouble, for a question of words, to take such pains to prove the existence of God.
But the elements, earth, etc., are multiple, not permanent, without [intelligence and] activity, without anything divine or venerable, impure: the elements are not God. Space, devoid of activity, is not God; nor is the Ātman, for we have seen that the Ātman does not exist.
Will you say that God is too great for us to be able to understand Him? His qualities too will surpass thought, and how can the quality of author of the world be attributed to Him?
But if God, in His nature, is incomprehensible, His work is comprehensible. — So be it, but we shall ask what He could have wished to create. Would it be Brahman, the “self” of creatures? but that is eternal. Would it be the elements? they are eternal. Would God create Himself? He is eternal. — On the other hand, knowledge is not created by God, since it has always proceeded from the object; pain and pleasure proceed from the act. What, then, has God created?
If the cause is always active and does not begin to act at certain moments, how could the effect begin? Now there is, after each chaos, a new beginning of the universe: therefore the cause is not an eternal and immutable God.
Why does God not accomplish at all times the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe? Apparently He has no need to take account of any other than Himself, for there is no other that He has not made Himself. What, then, is He waiting for to act?
Must He take account of the complex of conditions, as the potter needs clay, etc., to make a jar? Then God is not the cause you spoke of. He is not master of not acting when the complex of conditions is fulfilled; He is not master of acting when this complex is lacking.
If God acts without desiring it, He is clearly subject to another; if He acts desiring, He is subject to desire. Therefore, if He acts, He is not sovereign.
We have refuted above the Mīmāṃsakas and other philosophers who affirm the eternity of atoms.
The Sāṁkhyas affirm that the eternal cause of the world is the pradhāna, or Nature, that is to say the three “qualities”, goodness, passion and darkness, in the state of equilibrium. The world is nothing other than these three qualities in the state of non-equilibrium.
Now it is inadmissible that the pradhāna, which is one, should have a threefold nature: consequently, it does not exist. — “So be it,” it will be said, “but the qualities exist in themselves.” — Not so, for, taken one by one, they are threefold. You say, indeed, that everything is formed of the three “qualities”: each quality therefore possesses, besides its own nature, that of the other two.
If the “qualities” do not exist, sound, contact, etc., do not exist either.
Moreover, it is absurd to suppose that pleasure, etc., forms part of the nature of garments, which are devoid of thought. — Will you say that garments have pleasure as their nature because they produce it, not because they would be pleasure in themselves? — We have shown that things are illusory. And besides, for you, a follower of the Sāṃkhya, it is pleasure, etc., that is the cause, and not garments, etc.
Now we observe the contrary: there is pleasure by reason of garments, etc.; there is no pleasure in the absence of the garment.
As for the eternity, the immutability you attribute to pleasure, etc., which is the essence of the “qualities” of goodness, etc., it does not exist. If pleasure always existed in the manifest state, it would always be perceived. Will it be said that it passes into the subtle state, that it returns from “act” to “potency”? How can it be successively manifest and subtle?
If, abandoning the manifest state, it becomes subtle, subtlety and manifestation are transitory: and you are forced to admit that all your twenty-five principles are transitory in the same way: if manifested pleasure is nothing other than pleasure, it is clear that pleasure is transitory.
But it will be said: “It is inadmissible, by reason of its very non-existence, that a non-existent thing should come to be born!” — Willy-nilly, you must admit the birth of the non-existent manifestation. [And why should it not be the same for the rest?]
If, as you maintain, the effect resides in the cause, one eats filth when one eats rice; one can, by way of a garment, buy cotton seed and cover oneself with it.
“But,” it will be said, “[although the effect is in the cause], people of the world, through illusion, do not see it.” — So be it; but it seems indeed that you yourself, who know the truth, behave like people of the world! [You eat rice! You do not clothe yourself in cotton seed!]
Besides, it is not only the philosopher but also the common man who possesses this faculty of knowledge [by which one knows that “the effect is in the cause”]; why, then, does the ordinary man not see [things in truth]? — Will it be said that the way the ordinary man sees carries no authority? It follows that the things called manifested [and which are reached by the means of knowledge, perception, etc.,] do not exist. [And that is precisely our thesis, we Mâdhyamikas, who deny the validity of the means of knowledge.]
“But,” it will be said, “if the means of knowledge are not, [in reality], means of knowledge, it follows that the knowledge obtained through these means is false: therefore it is false, from the standpoint of absolute truth, that all things are empty.”
When one takes no account of the things to which existence is falsely attributed, one no more conceives their non-existence: of the “false” thing, [that is to say, the thing without its own nature], the non-existence is evidently false.
Suppose one dreams of the death of a son: the idea of the non-existence [or of the death] of the son, — which is a false idea, — stops the idea of the existence of the son, an idea just as false.
Critical examination shows that nothing exists without a cause; that nothing is found to exist in the causes taken either separately or all together; that nothing comes from one place or time into another place or time; that nothing endures identical to itself; that nothing passes elsewhere. In what, then, do the things that fools hold to be true differ from a magic show?
Whether it be the thing created by magic power or the thing created by causes, take the trouble, then, to seek whence it comes and whither it goes!
What appears through the concurrence of foreign elements and does not appear for lack of that concurrence is only a reflection, an artificial thing devoid of all reality.
The thing that exists has no need of causes; the thing that does not exist has no need of causes, for billions of causes could not modify the non-existent.
“It is not a question,” it will be said, “of modifying the non-existent, but only of giving it existence.” — How could what is in the state of non-existence become
Existent? And what can attain existence, if not the non-existent?
First, it will be said, owing to the presence of non-existence, the thing does not exist; later, through the disappearance of non-existence, the thing exists. — If existence does not exist at the time of non-existence, there will never be existence, for non-existence will not disappear so long as existence is not born; and on the other hand, so long as non-existence has not disappeared, existence cannot begin.
Likewise, the thing cannot pass into non-existence: it would follow that one and the same thing possesses the double nature of existence and non-existence.
Therefore there is never either annihilation or existence: this whole universe is free from birth as from destruction; the successive destinies of creatures are illusory like dreams, empty like the stem of the banana tree. There is no real difference between the creatures who are delivered and those who transmigrate.
Things are empty: nothing can be acquired or stolen, no one can be honored or despised by anyone at all; pleasure, suffering, the agreeable, the disagreeable are vain fictions, and however much one seeks for covetousness, one finds covetousness nowhere.
Let us examine the world of the living: what are creatures? who dies? who is reborn? who has lived? who is a relative or a friend?
Let us strive, then, O my brothers in ignorance, to understand that all is empty like space: we grow angry over vain quarrels, we rejoice in empty festivities; pursuing our own pleasure, we painfully spend, in sin, a life full of sorrows, efforts and despair; we torture ourselves, we maim one another; after death, we fall into the long tortures of hell, made more cruel by habits of happiness multiplied in good destinies.
Existences are oceans of pain, incomparable, terrible, without shores; and with that, feeble strength, a short life, a life spent uselessly seeking food and health amid hunger, sickness, fatigue, sleep, troubles or obstacles, amid fools: it is almost impossible to acquire the discernment of what is useful and what is harmful, to try to put an end to the rooted habit of distraction.
In the course of existences, Mâra, without respite, makes every effort to hurl us into the hells. [Do we obtain a human existence], the evil paths are many; the spirit of unbelief is almost invincible. — And [this existence once lost], it will be impossible, or almost impossible, to obtain again a human birth in its perfection, to obtain the appearance of a Buddha, to stop the torrent of the passions. — Alas! what a succession of sufferings!
Alas! how pitiable are these unfortunate ones in such great peril, swept along in the floods of suffering, who do not even see their deplorable condition!
Like madmen who, coming out of the water and feeling cold, would rush into the fire, and would begin this game over and over without end!
In extreme peril, they imagine themselves safe: they live as if they were immortal and forever young. But here they come, with death at their head, terrible calamities!
I long for the moment when I shall be able, with showers of happiness issuing from the cloud of my merits, to refresh and soothe the unfortunate ones tormented by the fire of suffering.
And blessed be the day when I shall be able, relying on the truth of appearance, to teach emptiness to those who believe in the reality of things, when I shall be able, with respect, to teach the virtues of merit freed from every notion of reality!
It was my intention to publish the translation of the tenth chapter of the Bodhicaryâvatâra: “Application of the merit [acquired by the composition of the present work to the happiness and salvation of creatures]”, remarkable above all for its invocations to Vajrapâni, to Mañjughoṣa and to Mañjuśrî, and rather poor, for the rest, from the philosophical point of view. All the known manuscripts of the text contain this chapter; so does the Tibetan version (Tandjour, Mdo XXVI).
Moreover, a summary of our treatise (Bodhicaryâvatârapiṇḍârtha) by a certain Dharmapâla (or Rakṣita) quotes its first stanza (Mdo XXVII, fol. 213). But, on the one hand, the tradition gathered by Târanâtha, the Tibetan historian of Buddhism, establishes that doubts prevailed in the Community about the authenticity of this chapter, and, on the other hand, the most notable of the commentators, Prajñâkaramati, who has served as our guide, while knowing of the existence of the tenth chapter, neglected to comment on it.
Although other interpreters or glossators, Kâla (? Nag-po-pa), Kalyânadeva (Dge-ba-lha), Vairocana, Çîla, Vibhûticandra, did not imitate this reserve.