Buddhism

Bodhicaryâvatâra, Chapter 9 — The Virtue of Science or Knowledge

Are not free from the ignorance that necessarily produces covetousness; they are not free from covetousness, from a covetousness that is not passionate, we grant; for covetousness can be non-passionate just as ignorance can.

Besides, affective sensation causes covetousness; now your saints are not free from sensation: [therefore the sight of truth is not enough to destroy the passions].

Likewise nirvana is impossible without the sight of emptiness, for so long as thought admits an object, it must rest upon the Noble Truths, upon their fruits, upon nirvana itself: therefore it is not delivered from rebirth.

Without emptiness, thought remains bound to the object of knowledge and, consequently, even if it is interrupted for a moment, it is condemned to be reborn: such is the case in the so-called unconscious ecstasy, in the ecstasy of destruction; such is the case for the unconscious gods, etc. One must therefore cultivate emptiness.

[“But,” it will be said, “does your Great Vehicle lead to nirvana?”] — Avoiding, thanks to emptiness, the attachment produced by the thought of eternity and the terror caused by the thought of annihilation, if the Bodhisattva remains in existence, it is through a folly of compassion, it is for the salvation of wretched creatures. Such is the fruit of emptiness.

[One may also understand:] “Granted, belief in the reality of things produces attachment to existence, the cause of rebirth; but the doctrine of emptiness produces the same result: through fear of annihilation, unfortunate creatures, by reason of their ignorance, do not obtain deliverance and remain in the existences of samsara.”

This objection raised against emptiness is unfounded; therefore, one must cultivate emptiness.

Emptiness, indeed, is the cause that destroys the double darkness, the darkness created by passion and by knowledge. If you desire Omniscience, hasten to cultivate emptiness.

[You say that the idea of emptiness causes fear and, in this way, stands in the way of deliverance: this is perhaps true at the beginning, but not when one reflects.] That one should be afraid of what causes pain is natural; but emptiness soothes pain: how could it frighten?

That one should be afraid of what is frightening, and even of what is not, is natural so long as one believes in the reality of the self: but when one knows, through the doctrine of emptiness, that the self is nothing, who could be afraid, since there is no self?

Neither the teeth, nor the nails, nor the bones, nor the blood, nor the mucus, nor the phlegm, nor the pus, nor the saliva, nor the fat, nor the sweat, nor the lymph, nor the viscera, nor the

Bowels, nor the excrement, nor the urine, nor the flesh, nor the muscles, nor the vital heat, nor the breath, nor the nine openings, nor the five sense-knowledges, nor intellectual knowledge are the self.

61) Indeed, if auditory knowledge were the self, sound would always be perceived, since the self is held to be eternal. If you say that auditory knowledge is permanent, but that its object is sometimes lacking to it, what does it know, in the absence of an object, that you should define it as knowledge?

62) If what does not know is “knowledge”, a piece of wood will be “knowledge”. It is established that there can be no knowledge without an object related to that knowledge.

63) [Moreover, if the “self” is, by its nature, auditory knowledge, it cannot be visual knowledge:] if the same [“self”, which knows sound,] also knows color, how is it that it does not hear [the sound] at the moment [when it sees the color]? — “Because,” it will be said, “at that moment, the sound is not related to it.” — But then the self is not auditory knowledge.

64) The principle whose nature is to perceive sound, how could it perceive color? What is not composed of parts, as the self is by definition, cannot have two natures. No doubt the same man is father [of his son] and son [of his father]; but this double nature is attributed to him by imagination; it is not real.

65 a) You yourselves, partisans of the Sâmkhya doctrine, deny the reality of all particular designations, for, according to you, what really exists are the three “qualities”: goodness, passion, darkness. There is therefore, in reality, neither father nor son.

65 b-66 a) When the “self” is occupied in knowing sound, [its nature of “visual knowledge”] is not perceptible; [it nevertheless exists, you say,] and it is through this second nature [that it knows color at other moments]: it follows that the self is like an actor [who puts on various costumes] and that it is not eternal.

66 b) [“But,” it will be said, “the being, — whether it be the actor or the self, — remains the same; it is essences or modes of being that are born, disappear and are renewed.”] — A strange unity, that of a being identical to itself which takes on new essences!

67 a) [“But the essences of the identical being are not all its essences in the same way;] some of them are unreal.” — Tell us, then, what its true essence is, its own essence!

67 b) Is it the quality of knowing in general? It follows that all men are one and the same thing.

68 a) And [likewise, by distinguishing the true essence from the adventitious essences], beings endowed with intelligence and those not endowed with intelligence will be held to be identical, for existence is common to them.

68 b) [In vain will it be said that there is resemblance, but not identity, between men, between intelligent and non-intelligent beings.] When the specific differences are declared unreal, — [by attributing to the self the nature of “knowledge” in general, instead of distinguishing auditory, visual knowledge, etc.], — on what will the notion of resemblance rest?

69) The self is not devoid of intelligence, for what is devoid of intelligence, a piece of cloth for example, is not the self. — Will it be said that the self is intelligent by virtue of its union with an element called “intelligence”? It follows that the self is destroyed as soon as it is deprived of knowledge.

70) [This conclusion is rejected by saying that the self, whether or not it is united with the element “intelligence”, remains what it is.] But if the self remains unmodifiable, what consequences does its union with “intelligence” entail for it? None, and, logically, the quality of self must be attributed to space, which is [likewise] devoid of knowledge and activity.

“But,” it will be said, “the relation of the act and its retribution is inadmissible if there does not exist a permanent “self”, author of the act, eater of the fruit. Supposing that the author of the act perishes, to whom will the fruit go?”

Our adversary agrees with us on this point, that the act and the fruit do not have the same support: the act is accomplished by the body of this existence, the fruit is eaten in a future life.

If, moreover, he maintains that the act and the tasting of the fruit presuppose the activity of the self, he contradicts himself: for his “self”, by definition, is free from activity. The discussion is therefore superfluous.

“But if there is no self, it follows that the act perishes for the author of the act, and that the fruit is eaten by someone who did not accomplish the act!” — One does not see, indeed, that the author of the act and the one who eats the fruit are the same: one is he who dies, another he who is reborn.

“But the Buddha formally taught personal responsibility: ‘So-and-so has accomplished the act; what other will taste its fruit?’ Therefore your doctrine is heretical.” — If the Buddha spoke of an “author of the act”, of an “eater of the fruit”, it was by attributing to the intellectual series the unity that it does not possess.

Past thought and future thought are not the self, for they do not exist at present. Will present thought be the self? In that case, the self no longer exists as soon as present thought disappears.

Just as the stem of the banana tree, reduced to its parts, does not exist as such, so the self, the supposed object of the notion “self”, is not real for one who examines it critically.

“But,” you will say, “if creatures do not exist, what then is the object of the future Buddha's pity?” — It is the creature, admitted as existing through an illusion that one assumes with a view to the goal to be reached, that is to say, the state of Buddha.

“But if creatures do not exist, who can have a goal to reach?” — No one, indeed, and the effort towards enlightenment proceeds from illusion; but, since its effect is the soothing of pain, the illusion of the goal is not forbidden.

“But if you admit the illusion of the goal in spite of its erroneous character, admit also the illusion of the self!” — The illusion of the self increases the feeling of self, the cause of pain. And since the feeling of self cannot be abolished as long as the illusion of the self lasts, better is the cultivation of the idea of the non-existence of the self, which will later disappear of itself.

“But,” it will be said, “if the self, as the philosophers understand it, is not the really existing object of the idea of self, is not that object the body?” — The body is neither the feet, nor the legs, nor the thighs, nor the hips, nor the belly, nor the chest, nor the arms, nor the hands, nor the sides, nor the armpits, nor the shoulders, nor the neck, nor the head. Where is the body among all these parts of the body?

“None of these limbs, taken separately, is the body; the body occupies them all, as the whole does its parts.” — This explanation is not satisfactory. That the body resides in part in all the limbs, that a part of the body is found in each limb, is absurd, for one will ask whether the body is also partially found in each of its parts, whence regressus ad infinitum; and, besides, it is the various limbs that reside in the various limbs: and they leave no room there for the body considered as possessing parts.

If, on the contrary, the body is found whole in each limb, in the hands, etc., not only does the objection remain that the limbs leave no room for the body, but, in addition, there will be as many bodies as there are limbs.

83) The body, [the supposed foundation of the notion “self”], is not within, [in the internal organs or elements, in an active purusha]. It is not without, for how would it reside in its limbs? It is not distinct from its limbs. What, then, is its mode of existence?

84) Therefore the body does not exist. If the notion of body is applied to the hands, etc., it is through an error determined by a certain arrangement [of the objects in question, the hands, etc.]: in the same way one takes a post for a man.

85) As long as a certain complex of causes acts, so long is the body taken for a man [or a woman: this is not the case when it is in the embryonic state or after cremation]; likewise, as long as a certain complex of causes acts with regard to the limbs, so long does one see a body in them.

86) [“Granted,” it will be said, “there is no body, but the limbs of the body exist.” — Error.] Just as [the body], so the foot does not exist, for it is only the sum of the toes; the toe is only the addition of the phalanges; the phalanges are divided into their parts.

87) These parts, in their turn, [are not real, but imagined, since they] are subdivided into atoms; as for the atom, it does not exist in itself, for it is subdivided, facing the six cardinal directions; and so also the six parts of the atom, [or, if] these parts have no parts, they are empty like space.

88) Therefore material things have no more reality than a vision in a dream. What prudent man could become attached [to anything at all?] And since the body does not exist, there is neither man nor woman.

89) If painful sensation is something real, why does it not harm those who are experiencing pleasure? If something, a savory food or [sandalwood], is agreeable in itself, why does the sad or [frightened] man not enjoy it?

90) It will be said that a man does not feel this or that sensation when it is dominated by a stronger sensation: but can one, in truth, call sensation what is not felt?

91) It will be said that painful sensation exists in a subtle state, but that its “state of manifestation” is suppressed [by a more energetic agreeable sensation. But one feels no pain to any degree when one feels pleasure. What, then, is subtle painful sensation?] A second sensation, [weaker], but wholly of pleasure? That is pleasure in a subtle state, and not suffering.

92) [“Granted, painful sensation is not always felt; but that does not prove that it is a creation of the mind: it simply happens that its causes are not sufficient to make it perceived.”] — We answer: if, according to you, in the presence of a cause of pleasure that contradicts it, painful sensation does not manage to emerge, do you not admit with us that sensation is only assent to a pure imagination?

93 a) It follows that the examination we are pursuing here is the effective antidote to sensation, for sensation is only the mind's assent.

93 b) And what proves it more than abundantly is that the saints or Yogins have as their sole food the meditations born in the field of pure concepts.

94) Let us note, on the other hand, that sensation cannot be produced by the cause assigned to it, by contact. If the senses and the object are separate, how do they concur? If they are not separate, they form a unity, and concurrence is equally impossible.

Source Shântideva, Bodhicaryâvatâra, trad. L. de La Vallée-Poussin (1907), archive.org (OCR corrigé) — I Choose Peace translation from the French · Contents