Memory remembers forgetfulness.
But what! When I name forgetfulness, I recognize what I name; and how would I recognize it, if I did not remember it? And I am not speaking of the sound of this word, I am speaking of the thing of which it is the sign, which I could not possibly recognize if the meaning of the sound had escaped me. Thus, when I remember memory, it is through itself that it is present to itself; when I remember forgetfulness, forgetting and memory come to me at once; memory, which makes me remember; forgetting, which I remember.
But what is forgetfulness, if not an absence of memory? How, then, is it present, so that I remember it, when its presence forbids me remembrance? Now, if it is true that in order to recall, memory must retain, and that without recalling forgetfulness it is impossible to recognize the meaning of this word, it follows that memory retains forgetfulness. The cause of forgetting, then, makes the cause of our forgettings appear in us? Must we not infer from this that it is not by itself, but by image, that it returns to memory? For if it were present itself, it would not make us remember, but forget.
Who will be able to penetrate, who will be able to understand these phenomena? I succumb to them, Lord, and it is beneath myself that I succumb. And here I am, to myself, a thankless soil that laughs at my toil and drinks my sweat. And I am not now sounding the depths of the heavenly vaults, I am not measuring the distances of the stars, I am not seeking the law of the earth’s balance; no, it is in my memory, which is nothing but myself, it is in my mind, which is nothing but myself, that I lose myself.
That all that I am not should be far from me is nothing astonishing; but what is nearer to me than myself? And behold, I cannot understand the power of my memory, I who, without it, could not even name myself!
I remember forgetfulness, then, I am certain of it; and how is it to be explained? Shall I say that what I remember does not reside in my memory? Shall I say that forgetfulness resides there only to keep me from forgetting? Equal absurdity. Shall I say further that my memory preserves only the image of forgetfulness, and not forgetfulness itself? Can I say so, if the impression of the image in memory must be preceded by the presence of the very object from which the image is detached?
It is thus that I remember Carthage, and the places I have passed through, and the faces I have seen, and all the reports the senses have transmitted to me: so with pain, so with health. These realities were there when my memory seized their image, and reflected it back to me in their presence, so as to reproduce them, when absent, to my remembrance.
If, then, forgetfulness abides in my memory, not by itself but in image, its presence was needed for its image to be taken from it? And if it was present, how could it engrave its image there where its presence effaces every imprint? And yet, however incomprehensible and inexplicable this mystery may be, I am certain that I remember forgetfulness, that murderer of remembrance.